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5.1  Introduction 
The insurance of bank deposits has become a common feature of banking 
regulation in many  countries, but until  recently  it was strictly  an American 
phenomenon.  Many countries  adopted deposit insurance in imitation of the 
United States, where-with  the exception of many economists-it  is regarded 
as an institution necessary for the stability of the banking system and the pro- 
tection of depositors. In the current debate about how to reform the U.S. bank- 
ing system, most argue on economic or political grounds that deposit insurance 
must be retained in  some form, despite the enonnous costs it has imposed. 
Federal deposit insurance may thus be the only enduring legacy of the New 
Deal’s banking legislation. 
The widespread  support for deposit  insurance  in  the United  State repre- 
sented a remarkable change of public opinion. Until the early 193Os, there was 
no general interest in deposit insurance. Even after the 1933 banking crisis, a 
bitter  struggle was waged over deposit insurance legislation. As Carter Go- 
lembe (1960,  181-82)  pointed  out over thirty  years ago, “Deposit insurance 
was not a novel idea; it was not untried; protection of the small depositor, while 
important, was not its primary purpose; and finally it was the only important 
piece of legislation during the New Deal’s famous ‘one hundred days’ which 
was neither requested nor supported by the new administration.” 
On the one hand, the answer to the question why the United States passed 
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long-dormant  deposit  insurance  legislation  is  simple.  In  1933, the  United 
States had just suffered the worst economic contraction in its history, and pro- 
ponents of deposit insurance offered it as a prophylactic against a repetition of 
the disruption and depositor loss that plagued America in the early 1930s. Had 
there been no Great Depression, it seems unlikely that the United States would 
have adopted deposit insurance. On the other hand, although the Great Depres- 
sion may  have constituted a necessary  condition for deposit insurance’s suc- 
cess, it is not clear why it was sufficient. There were many formidable obsta- 
cles to its passage, and there were alternative means to stabilize the banking 
system. 
The obstacles included the Roosevelt administration and the bank regulatory 
agencies, all of which opposed deposit insurance. Bankers were divided on the 
issue, but the banks who traditionally favored deposit insurance-small,  rural, 
single-office (unit) banks in states that prohibited bank branching-had  been 
in retreat economically since 1921 and had lost ground politically. Agricultural 
distress in the post-World  War  I years hastened the movement toward larger, 
more diversified banks, which had less need of protection. Experiences with 
deposit insurance at the state level had proved disastrous. Eight state-level de- 
posit insurance systems had been created since 1908 at the behest of small unit 
banks in those states. In the 1920s, all collapsed under the weight of excessive 
risk taking and fraud, encouraged by the protection of deposit insurance. The 
experiences of these states were widely discussed at the time (American Bank- 
ers Association  1933; White 1983; Calomiris 1992a). 
Deposit insurance cannot be explained as an emergency measure conceived 
in haste  to resolve  an ongoing  crisis. The legislation had  been  debated  for 
years, the banking crisis of  1933 had been over for months prior to the imple- 
mentation of the new insurance plan, and prior losses of banks and depositors 
were unaffected by the plan. Finally, there was an alternative long-run solution 
to the instability of the American banking system-nationwide  branch bank- 
ing-and  it had been gaining ground  politically  in the  192Os, partly  in re- 
sponse to widespread failures of agricultural unit banks and the failures of state 
deposit insurance schemes. 
The purpose of our paper is to explain how and why federal deposit insur- 
ance-special-interest  legislation  that had failed in Congress for nearly fifty 
year-was  adopted with near unanimity  in  1933. We consider the forces in 
favor of, and against, federal deposit insurance from the nineteenth century to 
1933. We argue that, even though the traditional supporters of federal deposit 
insurance had suffered repeated defeats and their power was at the nadir  in 
1933, the nature of the political struggle over deposit insurance changed in the 
1930s from a battle waged in Congress among special interests to one that 
engaged the general public. The banking collapse focused the attention of the 
public on the otherwise esoteric political issue of banking reform and offered 
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convince the public  that  federal deposit insurance was  the  best  solution  to 
banking instability. 
Throughout the history of the debate over federal deposit insurance, advo- 
cates and opponents agreed  that  an alternative  solution  to bank instability 
would be to reduce the number of banks and increase their geographic scope 
by repealing limits on bank branching and consolidation.' Advocates of  insur- 
ance-including  small banks-opposed  allowing greater bank concentration, 
while opponents of deposit insurance saw concentration  as the best means to 
promote stability. A key factor in the passage of  federal deposit insurance was 
the discrediting of large-scale banking by the advocates of  deposit insurance. 
5.2  The Historical Context of the Struggle over Federal Deposit 
Insurance 
5.2.1  Unit Banking, Bank Instability, and Deposit Insurance in the United 
States 
The debate over federal insurance of deposits was conducted with reference 
to earlier efforts to insure bank liabilities. Insurance schemes were enacted by 
six states prior to the Civil War, and by eight states between  1907 and 1917. In 
all of these cases, insurance of banknotes or deposits was the mutual responsi- 
bility of banks, not the state governments2  The instability of small, unit banks 
and !he  desire to insulate the economy from recurrent disruptions of bank fail- 
ures and suspensions of convertibility  motivated all of the deposit insurance 
systems created by  the various states (Golembe 1960). Thus the evolution of 
the structure of the banking system is closely tied to the history of deposit in- 
surance. 
The fragmentation and consequent instability of the American banking sys- 
tem are without parallel in the international history of banking. Experiments 
with large-scale banking-including  the antebellum  South and the federally 
chartered Banks of the United  States-were  early exceptions to reliance on 
I. It was widely understood that fractional-reserve banking, in and of  itself, was not the source 
of the peculiar instability of  banking in the United States. Other countries with fractional-reserve 
banking, but which lacked the fragmented banking system of the United States, avoided the epi- 
sodes of widespread bank failure and suspension of convertibility that characterized the U.S. expe- 
rience (Bordo 1985; Calomiris and Gorton 1991; Calomiris 1992b). 
2. The National Banking Acts of the  1860s provided federal government insurance of national 
banknotes. But this insurance was redundant protection because notes always were secured by  100 
percent (or more) of  their value in  the form of deposits of  US. government bonds held at the 
Treasury. Unlike the antebellum free-banking systems on which it was modelled, bond backing 
under the national banking system eliminated default risk on notes. The National Banking Acts 
were motivated by  the financial exigencies of the Civil War, as well as long-standing Jacksonian 
policy proposals to create a uniform national currency backed by  government bonds (Duncombe 
1841). Of course, government bonds and national banknotes did suffer numeraire risk, notably 
during the period of greenback suspension and silver agitation (Calomiris 1993). 148  Charles W.  Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
local, unit banks.  Despite  increasing  interest by  banks in consolidating and 
expanding branching networks, by the late nineteenth century restrictive state 
and federal regulations combined to make unit banking the norm. The U.S. 
banking system expanded until  1920 primarily by adding banks rather than by 
increasing the size of  banks. By  1920, there were more than  thirty thousand 
banks operating in the United States, or one bank for every 3,444 people. Thir- 
teen years later less than half that number remained, as banks disappeared in 
the wake of the severe agricultural distress of the 1920s and the Great Depres- 
sion. The structure of the American banking industry-thousands  of mostly 
small banks operating in geographical isolation of one another-produced  its 
propensity for panics and bank failures by reducing opportunities for diversi- 
fication of portfolios and by  making  it difficult for banks to coordinate their 
joint response to financial crises. 
The origins of unit banking and its persistence have been widely debated by 
historians.  One of  the most important preconditions  for bank fragmentation 
was federalism and the early judicial and legislative precedents giving individ- 
ual states authority to design their own banking systems and limit competition 
from institutions outside their state. In particular, the Supreme Court’s decision 
not to apply the commerce clause to banks and the Congress’s deference to 
state chartering powers set the stage for a banking system in which individual 
states could determine the industrial organization of banking within their bor- 
ders. Why states would choose unit banking is less clear. Here attention has 
focused on the role of populist propaganda by rent-seeking unit bankers (White 
1984) and on the benefits to some farmers from tying banks to particular loca- 
tions as a form of loan insurance (Calomiris 1992b). 
The inherent fragility of a unit-banking system set the stage for further regu- 
lations to stabilize  the  system, notably  deposit  insurance. Every one of  the 
fourteen  states that enacted deposit insurance legislation from  1829 to 19  17 
was a unit-banking  state seeking to find a means of  stabilizing  its banking 
system. States that chose to imitate wholly or even partly the standard interna- 
tional practice of allowing branch banking eschewed insurance. 
Of the six antebellum state mutual-guarantee  schemes, three had short lives 
and  suffered  large losses, while the other three  suffered virtually  no losses 
and survived for long periods (Golembe and Warburton  1958; Golembe 1960; 
Calomiris  1990). The varying degrees of  success of  these two groups of  sys- 
tems can be traced to the incentives created  under their different  regulatory 
regimes. The successful systems of Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa included limited 
numbers of banks (typically about thirty) with strong incentives to police one 
another and with broad powers of self-regulation and enforcement. Banks pro- 
vided substantial mutual protection to one another without encouraging exces- 
sive risk taking. These systems were eliminated by federal legislation that im- 
posed  a  10  percent  annual  tax  on  state  banknote  issues  (their  primary 
liabilities) to foster the newly created national banking system. 
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Michigan)  all had become insolvent  by  the  1840s as the result of common 
problems of design that induced adverse selection and moral hazard, encourag- 
ing risk taking within the insured system. The large numbers of members and 
limited mutual liability encouraged free riding, and the government provided 
little effective supervision and regulation. Protection to noteholders and depos- 
itors under these three mutual-guarantee systems was limited; protection rested 
on the ability and willingness of  surviving banks to remain in the systems to 
fund the losses of failed banks. Bank failures resulted in substantial losses to 
noteholders and depositors. 
Stimulated by the disruptions from the Panic of  1907, states began a second 
round of  experimentation  with mutual-guarantee  systems (White 1983; Ca- 
lomiris  1990, 1992a).’ Like the antebellum systems, all the post-1907  state 
insurance systems arose in unit-banking states dominated by large numbers of 
small, rural banks. White (I  983, 200) found that the probability of passage of 
deposit  insurance at the  state level was positively  affected  by  the  presence 
of unit-banking laws, small bank size, and a high bank-failure rate. 
Unfortunately, the postbellum  systems all adopted the design features of the 
failed antebellum systems, including limited mutual liability and government 
rather than  private regulation. In a sense, this imitation is not surprising. A 
successful system of  self-regulating banks with unlimited mutual liability- 
like those of Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa-would  not have been feasible for state 
unit-banking systems of hundreds of  unit banks like those of the postbellum 
deposit insurance states. In systems of hundreds of banks, banks would have 
little incentive to expend resources policing one another, since the benefits one 
bank would receive from monitoring another would be shared with too many 
others banks, while the costs of monitoring would be borne privately. Thus the 
decision to imitate the design of the failed antebellum systems was consistent 
with the industrial structure of banking in these large, agricultural states domi- 
nated by large numbers of unit banks. 
These systems suffered large losses and went bankrupt in the 1920s. Calom- 
iris (1990, 1992a) and Wheelock (1992) trace these large losses to the exces- 
3. At the federal level, protection was offered to depositors via the postal savings system, which 
was also established in the wake of the Panic of  1907 (Kemmerer  1917). Postal savings was the 
limited remedy to banking instability offered by  the victorious Republicans after the election of 
1908. The Democratic platform had contained a proposal for federal deposit insurance (O’Hara 
and Easley 1979, 742-43).  To  limit competition between postal savings and bank deposits, postal 
savings paid low interest, was restricted to small deposits, and was largely reinvested in the bank- 
ing system. While the government stood behind postal savings deposits (many of  which were 
deposited in commercial banks), this did not expose the government to significant risk because 
banks were required to secure postal savings account deposits with municipal, state, and federal 
bonds specified by  Congress (Zaun  1953, 27-28).  Thus government backing for postal savings 
was redundant in the same way  as the backing for national banknotes. Banks profited from the 
spread they earned on postal savings deposits (equal to the yield  on collateral bonds, less the 2 
percent interest paid to the post  office on the accounts). This profit turned negative during the 
Great Depression, as bond yielda fell. The result was a switch from the investment of postal savings 
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sive risk taking of banks in insured states during the World War I agricultural 
boom. Insured banking systems grew at an unusually high rate in the form of 
small banks with relatively low capital. In the face of the post- 1920 agricultural 
bust, insured banks failed at a high rate and with the lowest asset values relative 
to deposit claims of any banks in the 1920s. State banks in agricultural states 
all suffered from the large price and land-value declines of the 1920s, but the 
risk taking encouraged by  deposit insurance added greatly to the costs state 
banks suffered in the face of the decline. 
At the same time that the post- 1907 state insurance systems collapsed, con- 
ditions in the banking industry began to change in a direction that threatened 
the future of unit banking. Up to 19  14, the banking system had been expanding 
rapidly, which, under the prohibition of branch banking in most states, resulted 
in the proliferation of small unit banks. Beginning with the postwar recession, 
many banks failed in agricultural areas. They continued to fail at historically 
high rates, even as the rest of the economy thrived in the mid- 1920s. Surviving 
banks faced tougher competition as legal barriers to branching were weakened 
under pressure from larger urban banks and by efforts to allow surviving banks 
a means to fill the gaps created by  the many rural bank failures. The proven 
survivability of branching banks during the 1920s in contrast to the failures of 
the insured unit-banking systems also favored expanded branching and consol- 
idation (White 1983; Calomiris 1992a, 1992b). Table 5.1 provides data on bank 
industry trends during the 1920s. As the number of banks declined, the number 
of branches began to rise and mergers became more common. Banks began to 
diversify their activities, moving into a variety of financial services, including 
trust services, brokerage, and investment banking. A larger, more diversified, 
and safer portfolio (White 1986) and the availability  of a variety of new ser- 
vices attracted customers (Calomiris  1994). Smaller unit banks found it hard 
to compete in this environment and turned to the political arena to secure eco- 
nomic protection. 
5.2.2  Constituent Interests and Federal Deposit Insurance 
From an early date, advocates of deposit insurance pushed for federal legis- 
lation.  From  1886 through  1933, 150 bills  were  introduced  into either  the 
House or the Senate, proposing to establish federal deposit insurance. These 
proposals differed in their particulars regarding the range of membership (i.e., 
whether to restrict members to national  banks,  all Federal  Reserve member 
banks, or all national and qualifying  state banks), the form of protection  for 
deposits (mutual bank guarantee or government guarantee), and the charges to 
participating  banks, but  they  shared common fundamental features. All  the 
proposed  systems would  have established  a national  system of  insurance in 
which all banks would pay identical premiums and receive identical protection. 
Such a national system would have extended to the national level the model of 
deposit insurance adopted at the state level by the eight postbellum insurance 
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Table 5.1  Bank Mergers, Branching, and Securities Affiliates, 1900-1931 
Total  Branch Banks 
Assets  Loans and  Securities 
Bank  Acquired  Banks Operating  Number of  Investments  Affiliates  Number 
Year  Mergers  ($mil)  Branches  Branches  ($mil)  of Banks  of Banks 
1900  20 
1901  41 
1902  50 
1903  37 
1904  63 
1905  69 
1906  56 
1907  54 
1908  97 
1909  80 
1910  127 
1911  119 
1912  128 
1913  118 
1914  142 
1915  154 
1916  134 
1917  123 
1918  119 
1919  178 
1920  181 
1921  281 
1922  337 
1923  325 
1924  350 
1925  352 
1926  429 
1927  543 
1928  501 
1929  571 
1930  699 
1931  706 
87  1 I9 
196  350 
292  548 
397 
650 
874  530 
710  547 
750  610 
1,052  67 1 
662  706 
702  720 
1.595  744 
1,555  740 
2,093  175 
5,614  764 
2,903  75 1 


















9,110  277 
10,922  314 
12,480  372 
14,763  413 
16,511  464 
17,591  493 
20,068  56 1 
2 1,420  591 
22,49  I  566 




















Sources: Data on the number of  bank mergers from Chapman 1934, 56; the assets of  hanks ab- 
sorbed by merger from White 1985,286; the number of hanks operating branches, the number of 
branches in operation, and the loans and investments of branching banks from Board of Governors 
1976, 297; the securities affiliates  of  hanks from Peach  1941, 83; and the number of state and 
national commercial hanks from Board of Governors 1976, 19. 
In economic terms, regardless of whether insurance was funded by banks or 
backed by a government guarantee, such a scheme necessarily involves cross- 
subsidization of risk across states. States with banks that suffered higher risks 
of failure would gain at the expense of other states’ banks, and in the case of 
government guarantees, at the expense of  the rest of  the nation’s taxpayers. 
From this  standpoint,  one would  expect that  the states most  likely to favor 152  Charles W.  Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
national insurance would be those with the most vulnerable banking systems. 
For these  states, the common costs of insurance  would be more than reim- 
bursed by the expected bailouts of failed banks by relatively stable banks (and 
taxpayers) from other states. Compared to state-level deposit insurance, federal 
deposit insurance was particularly attractive to unit bankers located in the high- 
risk  rural  states because  it offered greater protection  at lower cost.  But this 
same fact made federal insurance legislation less likely to succeed. Rural unit 
banks wielded more power in their states than they wielded in Congress, where 
banks from states with relatively stable banking systems would oppose cross- 
subsidization of risky banks. 
One way to test this special-interest, rent-seeking view of support and oppo- 
sition for federal deposit insurance would be to compare each state’s banking 
system’s vulnerability with its support for federal legislation creating deposit 
insurance. 
5.2.3  Infemng Constituent Interest from Congressional Behavior 
Difficult conceptual  issues and empirical pitfalls arise in inferring constit- 
uents’ interests from politicians’ support for particular legislation. Conceptu- 
ally, it is not always clear how to map from congressional behavior to the prob- 
able interests of constituents. There is a large and growing  literature on the 
difficulty of measuring constituent interest from voting records (e.g., Poole and 
Rosenthal, chap. 3 in this volume). Elected representatives often trade votes on 
issues, so that  a negative  vote on one bill does not necessarily  indicate that 
constituents would be opposed to that bill. Political parties often play an im- 
portant  role  in  enforcing  intertemporal  trade-offs  in  voting  across different 
bills. Party discipline can encourage a representative to vote against his constit- 
uent  interests on one bill  in exchange for promised  votes on another bill, or 
perhaps in exchange for party support for introducing a “private” bill to benefit 
a select group of his supporters. Poole and Rosenthal suggest that party disci- 
pline is likely to be most important in close votes. In votes that are not close, 
the party will free members to vote their constituents’ interests, since there is 
no benefit from trading  votes. These considerations  suggest that voting pat- 
terns, particularly in close votes, may reveal little about constituent interests, 
especially on issues that are not viewed as the highest priorities of one’s con- 
stituents. 
In the case of congressional  voting on deposit insurance  bills, there is an 
even better reason to look for an alternative to representatives’ voting records 
as a measure of constituent interests-namely,  the scarcity of  voting data. Of 
the  150 bills that were introduced into Congress to establish federal deposit 
insurance between  1886 and 1933, only one bill ever came to a roll call vote 
(amended HR 7837 in December 1913).  Of these 150 bills, 147 never emerged 
from the House or Senate committees that  were given the responsibility  of 
considering them. This is a very poor batting average. From the 49th to the 73d 
Congress (from 1886 to 1933), 5 percent of bills introduced were enacted into 153  The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance 
law, of  which roughly one-third  were “private”  bills, that is, bills benefiting 
particular named individuals (Bureau of the Census 1975, 1081-82).  Thus de- 
posit insurance bills suffered an unusually low chance of emerging from com- 
mittee, much less being enacted into law. 
To understand these facts, it is useful to review the procedures for the con- 
sideration of bills by Congres~.~  The process in the House begins with bills 
being dropped into a “hopper” on the clerk’s desk. In the Senate, the sponsor 
must gain recognition on the floor and make the announcement of the bill’s 
introduction. These bills are then assigned to a committee to analyze and per- 
haps  amend the bill. Most bills die in committee. If  a bill  makes it out of 
committee, the House or Senate can vote on the bill or send it back to commit- 
tee, where, as before, it typically dies. Once bills reach the House or Senate 
after making it out of committee, there are several possibilities. In the House, 
a bill gets placed before the Committee as a Whole (which is made up of at 
least one hundred representatives). A bill must pass through the Committee as 
a Whole before the House of Representatives can vote on the bill. The Commit- 
tee as a Whole, assuming there is a quorum of one hundred members, cannot 
have a roll call vote. Instead they vote by voice, division (standing), or teller 
(lining up and being counted on a pro or con side of the aisle). If a bill makes 
it out of the Committee as a Whole, it can be voted on by  voice, division, or 
roll call. However, it takes a one-fifth approval-assuming  there is a quorum- 
to be granted a roll call. In the House, roll calls are time-consuming events and 
do not happen often. 
In the Senate, roll call votes occur relatively more often because there are 
fewer members and it does not use up much time. But the Senate also utilizes 
voice votes and division votes. As in the House, it takes one-fifth of senators 
present to approve a roll call. This minimum can be hard to achieve sometimes, 
as senators can be present at a quorum call but exit soon after, leaving only a 
handful of senators on the floor for the vote on the motion for yeas and nays. 
It is likely that the authors of deposit insurance bills (prior to 1932) were 
aware that their efforts would fail. One indication of their unlikely success is 
that deposit insurance bills were typically not introduced by the chairmen of 
committees that would consider the bills, or even by members of the commit- 
tees. Committee members, and particularly their chairmen, enjoy considerable 
power in determining whether a bill will be successful. Bills not introduced by 
committee chairmen, or subcommittee chairmen, stand little chance of emerg- 
ing from the ~ommittee.~  From 1886 through  193  1, 120 bills were introduced 
4. For additional details see Berman 1964; Froman 1967; Davidson and Oleszek 1981; Morrow 
1969; Reid 1980. 
5. The power of the committee chairmen is difficult to exaggerate (Berman 1964, 212). One of 
their key powers lies in their ability to hold up a bill in committee. They can do this by  refusing 
to schedule a bill for a hearing or by  setting meeting times when the bill’s  proponents cannot 
possibly attend. Committee chairmen also hire and fire most of the committee’s staff, assign mem- 
bers to subcommittees, and lead floor debates on bills reported from their committees,  among 
other things. They can form subcommittees in such a way that they can kill a bill by sending it to 154  Charles W.  Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
on deposit insurance. In only twenty-one of these cases were they introduced 
by members of the committees that would consider them, and in only one case 
(notably in 1908) was a bill introduced by a committee chairman. 
Congressmen and senators who introduced these unpromising bills often did 
so repeatedly over many years, possibly  as a signal to constituents  that the 
failure of such legislation was not due to a lack of effort on their part. If this is 
correct, then it seems reasonable to suppose that the identities of those intro- 
ducing legislation are a good indicator of  strong constituent interests in that 
legislation. In  the empirical patterns we  report, we focus on the differences 
between  states whose representatives authored bills and other states, examin- 
ing correlations between authorship and economic indicators at the state level. 
We confine most of  our analysis to the period prior to the national banking 
crises of September  1931-March  1933. In  1932 and  1933, when nine of  the 
thirty bills introduced were authorized by committee members (including three 
by Chairman Steagall and one by Senator Glass), the likelihood of passage was 
known to be higher, and the link between the identity of authors and constit- 
uent  interests  may  have  been  weaker  (given  the  compromises  being  engi- 
neered, authors may have been chosen to maximize the chance of  successful 
passage). We  also discuss voting patterns  for the  19  13 roll call votes in the 
House and Senate. 
5.2.4  Empirical Evidence on the Characteristics of States with Authors of 
Bills 
We define states whose congressmen or senators authored deposit insurance 
bills as “authoring states,” and the remaining states as “nonauthoring states.” 
Appendix table SA.l presents the full list of  bills introduced; their date and 
congressional session; their authors; each author’s house of Congress, party 
affiliation, and state; and whether the author (if a congressman) represents a 
“large-city’’ constituency or its complement, which we call a “rural” constitu- 
ency. If the author is a “large-city” congressman, we state the name of the city 
contained within his congressional district. Table 5A.  I also indicates whether 
the bill specified mutual guarantee or government guarantee of deposits, and 
which banks would have been included in the insurance system. 
Both major parties account for large numbers of proposals, with fifty-eight 
bills introduced by Republicans and ninety introduced by Democrats, but the 
relative authorship of Democrats and Republicans shifted somewhat over time. 
a subcommittee stacked with members opposed to the bill, or they can push through bills they 
support by  sending the bill to a committee stacked in its favor. 
The committee chairman, or ranking minority committee member, will customarily agree as a 
matter of  courtesy to introduce a bill originating in the White House. The bills from the executive 
branch typically get the most attention from committees. Deposit insurance bills introduced into 
the House of Representatives between 1886 and 1933 were referred to the Committee on Banking 
and Currency. Senate deposit insurance bills were referred to the Committee on Finance until 
1919, and thereafter referred to the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. 155  The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance 
Eleven Republicans authored bills from  1886 to 1906, compared to only six 
authored by  Democrats. From  1907 through  1933, thirty-six Democrats and 
twenty-eight Republicans authored bills. 
One interesting pattern shown in table 5A.  1 is the changing regional compo- 
sition of  authoring states over time. For the first twenty-five bills introduced 
(covering  1886-1906),  the regional  composition  of  authors  is very  diverse. 
Eastern states (Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Ohio) account for 
eleven  of  the  twenty-five  bills  and  six of  the  nineteen  authors,  ten  authors 
hailed from the  Middle West and West  (Wisconsin, Missouri,  Kansas,  Ne- 
braska, Washington, and North Dakota), and three were southerners (Virginia, 
Mississippi,  and  Alabama).  For the  next  eighty-nine  bills  (covering  1907- 
February  1931), authorship  is highly  concentrated  in  the West and Middle 
West, which accounts for sixty-six of the bills introduced, with the South ac- 
counting for the remaining nineteen bills (thirteen of which are authored by 
Mississippians and Alabamans). During this period, bills introduced by east- 
erners are confined  to four bills  introduced  by  Pennsylvanians  in  1907 and 
1908. 
For the final period (covering December 1931-May  1933),  the regional mix 
again becomes more diverse. Of the thirty-six bills introduced during this pe- 
riod, seven states that had not been “authoring” states in the previous twenty 
years  (New  York,  Ohio, California, Michigan, Tennessee, Florida,  and Vir- 
ginia) account for eighteen of the bills introduced. This change in 193  1 is also 
visible in the change from a nearly universal rural identity of authors prior to 
1931 to a mixture of rural and urban authors from 193  1 through 1933. Of the 
eighty bills introduced in the House prior to December  1931, only four were 
authored by congressmen who could be regarded as coming from major cities 
(Omaha, Denver, Chicago, and Atlanta). From December  193  1 through 1933, 
five of  twenty-six  bills  were  introduced by  House  members  from Chicago, 
New York City, Columbus, Detroit, and Tulsa. 
What explains the changes over time in the locational composition of au- 
thors? Tables 5.2 through 5.4 present evidence on differences in the character- 
istics of  these two sets of  states for various time periods. In analyzing cross- 
sectional characteristics of authoring and nonauthoring states, we focus on the 
period before December 193  1, prior to the emergence of a congressional con- 
sensus in favor of federal insurance. The dates over which variables are defined 
often are indicated by data availability. Given the small sample size, we empha- 
size median comparisons, which provide a better gauge than means because 
they are relatively insensitive to outliers. 
For the twentieth century, the authoring states tend to differ from other states 
in ways consistent with the view that special interest groups in those states, 
which stood to benefit from cross-subsidization  of risk, encouraged  deposit 
insurance proposals by their elected officials in Washington. The banking sys- 
tems  of  authoring  states were  more vulnerable  than  those  of  nonauthoring 
states by several of the measures reported in tables 5.2 through 5.4. Authoring Table 5.2  Bank Characteristics in Authoring and Nonauthoring States 
State Banks  National Banks 
Authoring  Nonauthoring 
Mean  Med.  S.D.  Mean  Med.  S.D. 
Authoring  Nonauthoring 
Mean  Med.  S.D.  Mean  Med.  S.D. 
Bank-failure rate (%)” 
186496  0.54  0.45  0.47 
1907-1 0  0.13  0.04  0.20 
192 1-29  4.23  4.67  2.86 
1896  465  212  553 
1910  448  251  594 
1919  813  449  963 
1929  729  545  703 
Small-Town bank suspensions relative to totalh 
1920-3 I  0.94  0.97  0.07 
Deposit-loss rate (%) 
For failed banks, 
1920-3  Ie  44.8  40.6  11.2 
For all banks, 1920sd  1.77  2.19  1.05 































0.39  0.37  0.27  0.32  0.24  0.32 
0.12  0.10  0.12  0.15  0.00  0.21 
2.25  1.76  1.76  0.96  0.37  1.45 
837  697  656  596  491  312 
1030  857  630  1202  864  925 
1969  1681  1067  2409  1720  2041 
2025  1615  859  3335  2634  2456 
0.95  0.97  0.07  0.86  0.92  0.21 
40.9  49.3  18.6  35.1  31.4  18.4 
1.07  0.91  0.92  0.41  0.08  0.84 
Sources: Data on bills introduced are from table 5A.1. Bank-failure rates for 1864-96  are from Upham and Lamke 1934, 246. For 1896- 
1929, data on numbers of national and state banks for each state are reported in Board of Governors 1959. Data on bank failures after 1896 
are given in Comptroller of the Currency 1907-29.  Data on bank suspensions, their location, and deposit loss rates are constructed from 
Goldenweiser et al. 1932, 5:183-97. 
Notes: Authoring states are those where one or more of the state’s representatives or senators introduced a federal deposit insurance bill. 
Authorship is categorized into three periods:  1886-98,  1905-19,  and 1920-February  1931. The authoring states in each of  these periods 
are matched by date with items listed in the table. For example, average bank size (1910) is matched with authoring during 1905-19. 
”Bank-failure rates for 1921-29  are defined as the ratio of the sum of each year’s liquidated banks to the sum of each year’s surviving banks. 
For the periods prior to the 1920s, bank-failure rates are defined as the ratio of average annual failures during the period divided by  the 
number of banks in 1896 plus the number of failures during the period. 
hSmall towns had populations of under twenty-five thousand. 
‘The deposit-loss rate for failed banks is one minus the ratio of payments from assets to proven claims. 
dThe deposit-loss rate for all banks is the product of the bank-failure rate for 1921-29  and the deposit-loss rate for failed banks. 157  The Origins of' Federal Deposit Insurance 
Table 5.3  Characteristics of Authoring and Nonauthoring States 
Authoring States  Nonauthoring States 
Mean  Median  S.D.  Mean  Median  S.D. 
Branching indicator 
unit = 0, branch = I 
1910"  0.29  0  0.47  0.52  I  0.5  1 
192s  0.22  0  0.44  0.41  0  0.50 
1910  0.03  0.00  0.04  0.07  0.03  0.09 
I920  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.10  0.02  0.13 
I930  0.07  0.01  0.11  0.17  0.02  0.22 
1919  0.70  0.73  0.16  0.61  0.63  0.17 
I929  0.66  0.69  0.1 I  0.61  0.61  0.17 
1909-13  0.8  I  0.8 I  0.28  0.99  0.94  0.37 
192 1-29  1.09  1.13  0.29  1.05  0.96  0.39 
I920  0.47  0.46  0.13  0.32  0.3  I  0.18 
Branching ratio' 
Non-Fed  members relative to all banks 
Business-failure"  rate (95) 
Farm to total population 
Sources: Data on bills  introduced are from table 5A.  I. These data, as well  as data on Federal 
Reserve members  and  nonmembers,  are  taken  from  Board  of  Governors  1976, 298,  24-33. 
Branching indicator for I910 is constructed from Calomiris 1992b, 86-87.  Business-failure rates 
are derived from US.  Bureau of the Census 1909-29.  Data on farm and nonfarm population are 
from Leven  1925, 259. 
Nufps:  Authoring stats are those where one or more of the state's representatives or senators intro- 
duced a federal deposit insurance bill. Authorship is categori~ed  into three periods:  1886-98, 
1905-19, and 1920-February  1931. The authoring states in each of these periods are matched by 
date with items listed in the table.  For example, the branching ratio (1910) is matched with au- 
thoring during 1905-19. 
"he  branching indicator distinguishes states that allow new branches to open from other states. 
hThe branching indicator equals one if  at least one branch  exists, and if  continuing branching 
(however limited) is allowed, as described in Board of Governors 1926. 
'The ratio of bank offices operated by branching banks relative to total bank offices in the state. 
'Business-failure  rates are annual averages for commercial enterprises 
Table 5.4  Deposit Insurance Bills and Their Authors 
All States  Authoring Statesd 
BiMAuthors per State  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Bills introduced, 1886-98  (18 bills)  0.4  0  1.8  2 
Authors of bills, 1886-98  (1 5 authors)  0.3  0  I .5  1 
Bills introduced, 1905-19  (63 bills)  1.7  0  5  3 
Authors of bills, 1905-19  (32 authors)  0.6  0  1.8  1 
Bills introduced, 1920-Feb.  1931 (29 bills)  0.9  0  4.3  3 
Authors of  bills, 1920-Feb.  1931 (15 authors)  0.5  0  2.2  I 
Source: Data on bills introduced are from table 5A.  I. 
federal deposit insurance bill. 
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states had  much  higher  bank-failure  rates  and higher  deposit  loss rates  on 
failed banks in the 1920s. 
The greater vulnerability of authoring states’ banking systems in the  1920s 
is partly explained by the structure of their banking systems, which tended to 
be dominated by small, unit banks. There is a strong association between unit 
banking and the support for deposit insurance legislation. States committed to 
unit banking tended to be supporters of deposit insurance. Nonauthoring states 
tended to rely relatively more on branch banking. Furthermore, consistent with 
standard historical  writings  on the links between agrarian populism  and de- 
posit insurance, we find that states promoting federal deposit insurance legisla- 
tion had a higher ratio of rural-to-total population and a greater proportion of 
bank failures in towns of less than twenty-five thousand inhabitants. 
Comparisons across states for the nineteenth century reveal no apparent dif- 
ference between  authoring and nonauthoring  states. The increase in the re- 
gional concentration of  support for deposit insurance in the twentieth century 
is  mirrored  in  starker differences  between  the  authoring  and  nonauthoring 
states. In the nineteenth century, within-state  differences  may  have been  as 
important as cross-state differences in risk, making it difficult to detect the role 
of special interests at the state level. Later, differences across states seem to be 
more important than differences within states. This is largely explained by the 
changes in various states’ regulations of branching, and the stability branching 
brought to these states’ banking systems. From  1900 to 1930, the number of 
branching banks in the United  States rose from 87 to 751, and the number 
of  branches rose from  119 to 3,522. This movement  toward branching  was 
concentrated in  a few  states,  and many of  these had  been  states with  early 
supporters of deposit insurance legislation (notably Ohio, New York, Pennsyl- 
vania, and New Jersey). During the first decade of the twentieth century, as the 
branching  movement took hold  in these states, their elected  officials  disap- 
peared from the list of congressmen and senators authoring deposit insurance 
bills. These four states alone saw increases in the number of banking offices 
operated by branching banks from 56 in 1900 to 1,534 in 1930. 
The branch-banking movement of the early twentieth century created pro- 
found differences across states in the propensity for failure, which encouraged 
high-risk unit-banking states to attempt to free ride on the stability of branch- 
banking states through the establishment of national deposit insurance. As the 
agricultural banking crisis wore on in the grain and cotton belts in the  1920s, 
those states became the staunchest advocates of deposit insurance legislation. 
Not surprisingly, representatives of  states that had passed state-level  deposit 
insurance between 1907 and 19 17 (Oklahoma, Texas, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Washington, Texas, and Mississippi) were among the most fre- 
quent authors of bills for national insurance from 1907 through 1931, account- 
ing for fifty-five of ninety-five bills introduced during this period. The collapse 
of the state insurance systems in the 1920s created a new urgency for protec- 
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Nebraska  and  Oklahoma,  whose  banks  were  among  the  smallest,  least- 
diversified, and lowest-capitalized banking systems in the country during the 
1920s, led the movement for national insurance plans. Of the thirty-four bills 
proposed between 1921 and 193  1, fourteen were introduced by representatives 
of Oklahoma and Nebraska. 
5.2.5 
The only federal deposit insurance bill on which roll call votes were taken 
was amended HR 7837, which was voted on by both houses of  Congress in 
December  1913. The bill was proposed as an addition to the Federal Reserve 
Act, and it originated in the Senate. The bill passed the Senate with 54 yeas, 
34 nays, and 7 not voting. It then went to the House, where it was defeated 
with a vote of 295 nays, 59 yeas, 78 not voting, and 2 “present.” These votes 
are described in detail in table 5.5. 
In the Senate, where the vote was close, party discipline was enforced more 
rigorously, and the vote was essentially along party lines. Forty-seven of fifty- 
four yeas were cast by Democrats, and all nays were cast by Republicans. Four 
Republicans and three Democrats declined to vote. While votes along party 
lines provide little evidence of state constituent interests, the states of the sena- 
tors casting “renegade” votes (those who went against their party) are interest- 
ing to examine. Five of  the  seven Republican  senators who voted  yea were 
from states that had enacted or soon would enact deposit insurance at the state 
level (Nebraska, South Dakota, and Washington). 
The other two Republican senators who voted yea were from California and 
Massachusetts. While both of these  states allowed some branch banking by 
191  3, they  were  both  essentially  unit-banking  states at that  time,  and  both 
states had suffered unusually high recent spates of bank and business failures, 
as shown in table 5.6. Unlike the rural  states supporting deposit insurance, 
bank failures in these two states (and in Pennsylvania) were associated with 
substantial commercial distress. Massachusetts saw three of its national banks 
fail from  1907 to  1913. From  1907 through  1913, sixteen banks were liqui- 
dated by order of the superintendent of banking in California, and one national 
bank was placed into receivership by the comptroller. These rates of bank fail- 
ure had not been  seen in California since the mid-1890s. California law did 
not explicitly disallow branching, but banks were only allowed to branch with 
the permission of the state superintendent of banking, and the superintendent 
would not grant permission without the approval of  local banks in the town 
where the proposed branch would be located. When economic distress threat- 
ened the solvency of  unit banks, A. P.  Giannini’s requests to open branches 
were granted, beginning with the San Jose branch of the Bank of Italy in 1909, 
which received the explicit endorsement of local bankers and planters. Prog- 
ress remained slow until  1916, when the revealed benefits of branching and 
the precedents established  by  Giannini helped to encourage widespread  ap- 
proval  for  branching.  Similarly,  in  Massachusetts  only  fourteen  banks  had 
The 1913 Roll Call Votes 160  Charles W. Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
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Table 5.5  House and Senate Voting Patterns on Amended HR 7837, December 1913 
State  House Voting  Senate 
Democrats  Republicans  Other  State Total  Democrats  Republicans  State Total 
Parties' 
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82  1  1 
7  2  2 
I  2  2 
461  11  II 
4  2  2 
41  2  2 
1  I  I  II 
I31  2  2 
661  2  2 
92  2  2 
11  2  2 
6  I1  10  I  I  11 
II  I  2  2 
151  1  I  11 
173  I  1  I1 
62  1  I  1  I 
13  3  I  I1  I 
51  I  I  I1 
31  I  II  I 
2  10  1  2  2 
91  2  2 
14  2  I  I  1  I 
63 2  2 
11 2  2 
28 2  2 
3  2  2 
42  1  I  2 
2  1  I  11 
84  2  2 
1  11  I1 
12  2 
28  15  1  1  11 
2173 1  1  11 
3s 2  2 
12 2  2 
5  17  12  2  2 
21  2  2 
16 2  2 
12  2  2 
181  2  2 
11  53  I  I  1  1 
2  2  2 
91  2  2 
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Table 5.5  (continued) 
State  House Voting  Senate 
Democrats  Republicans  Other  State Total  Democrats  Republicans  State Total 
Partiesa 
Y  N  NIV  Y  N  NIV  Y  N  NN Y  N  NN Y  N  NIV  Y  N  NN Y  N  NN 
WA  21 I  31  2  2 
WI  3  8  11  2  2 
wv  11  31  42  1  1  I1 
WY  1  1  11  11 
Totals  38  207  48  17  XS  32  4  3  59  295  80  47  3  7  34  4  S4  34  7 
Source; Voting records are taken from Roll Call Voting records available through the Interuniversity Con- 
sortium for Political and Social Research. 
Note: Y, N, and NN correspond to yea, nay, and no vote 
dlncludes  the Progressive Republicans, Progressives, and Independents 
branches in 1910, with a total of sixteen branches in operation. By 1930, fifty- 
eight banks were operating 128 branches. 
The House vote was not nearly as close as that in the Senate, and there is 
little evidence of any attempt to enforce party discipline in the House. Thus 
the House vote should provide a better indication of constituent interests. The 
fact that roll call votes divide into three categories-yea,  nay, and abstention- 
complicates any attempt to measure support and opposition for a bill. As a first 
step toward measuring  support for the legislation, we divide states into two 
groups according to their degree of opposition to the bill. We designate states 
as relatively strong supporters (weak opponents) if the proportion of nay votes 
in that state is less than two-thirds and the proportion of yea votes is greater 
than  20 percent.  We  chose these thresholds to place a sufficient number of 
states in  the  supportive  group for purposes  of  comparison.  Changes  in  the 
choice of thresholds will affect our relative sample sizes but not our qualitative 
results. By our measure, there are thirteen states designated as relatively strong 
supporters  of  the  legislation.  These  include  California,  Florida,  Georgia, 
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas. Five of these states are among the eight states that 
passed deposit insurance legislation at the state level (Kansas, Mississippi, Ne- 
braska, Oklahoma, and Texas). These thirteen states are not the same as the 
fourteen  states whose congressmen  introduced  deposit insurance  legislation 
between  1905 and 1919 (the definition of interest in deposit insurance used in 
table 5.2), but there is substantial overlap.  Seven  states are in both  groups, 
including the  five “supporting”  states  that enacted  state-level  deposit insur- 
ance, as well as Missouri and Pennsylvania. Table 5.6 shows that supporting 
states (the thirteen  from the House vote) had  more fragile banking  systems 
than  did  other  states,  as measured  by  median  comparisons  of  bank  size, 
branching ratios, rural population ratios, and business- and bank-failure rates. 162  Charles W.  Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
Table 5.6  House of Representatives Vote on Federal Deposit Insurance in 1913: 
Comparison of Characteristics of Thirteen “Supportive” and Thirty- 
Five “Unsupportive” States 
Relatively Unsupportive 
Relatively Supportive States  States 
Mean  Median  S.D.  Mean  Median  S.D. 
State bank-failure rate (%), 
1907-1 0  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.19  0  0.45 
National hank-failure rate 
(8).  1907-10  0.14  0.10  0.19  0.14  0  0.19 
Average state bank assets, 
1910  434  21 I  493  949  387  1648 
Average national bank assets, 
1910  1 I07  759  766  1154  873  862 
Business-failure rate (70). 
1909-1 3  I .07  1.03  0.31  0.87  0.78  0.35 
Branching indicator unit = 0, 
branch = I, 1910  0.3  I  0  0.48  0.49  0  0.5  I 
Branching ratio, 1910  0.03  0  0.05  0.62  0.03  0.09 
Farm to total population  1920  0.39  0.42  0.17  0.33  0.3  1  0.18 
Sources: See tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
Note: A supportive state is defined as one for which at least 20 percent of  its representatives voted 
yea, and no more than two-thirds nay on the December 1913 hill to establish federal deposit insur- 
ance (HR 7837). Other definitions are given in tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
The relative  strength of  voting  support in the House by  the congressmen 
from states that had passed insurance legislation at the state level may reflect 
a variety of factors, including a fragile unit-banking system, recent high rates 
of bank failure and business failure, and competitive considerations.  On the 
latter point, national banks in insured states (which had been excluded from 
participation in state insurance plans by a ruling of  the comptroller of the cur- 
rency) may have desired to have access to a national insurance plan to be able 
to compete with the existing state insurance systems in their states, and may 
have lobbied harder than national banks in other states for the bill. 
By the same token, in noninsured state systems, small rural unit banks may 
have opposed the bill more than similar banks  in insured states. The reason 
small state unit banks in many other states might have opposed amended HR 
7837 is that it stipulated that membership in the federal insurance system was 
restricted to Federal Reserve member bunks, and many of them would not be 
Fed members. The original intent of the Federal Reserve Act was to encourage 
all banks (through the benefits of access to the discount window) to join the 
Federal Reserve System, but the costs of compliance with Fed regulations- 
especially reserve requirements-kept  many small banks from joining (White 
1983, 64-125,  177-87).  A small rural bank that may have expected to opt out 
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who were Fed members to have access to federal insurance. The presence of 
state insurance, therefore, would reduce the incentives of small banks to lobby 
against the federal insurance  plan,  since state insurance  offered  a means to 
have insurance  without joining the Fed. Indeed, as we discuss below,  some 
small banks may have opposed federal deposit insurance in the 1930s initially 
because  it did not  extend  membership to non-Fed  members. Congressional 
supporters of rural unit banks eventually succeeded in the 1930s in opening up 
membership in  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation  (FDIC) to state 
banks that were not members of the Fed.6 
Thus far we have shown that prior to  1931 state support for federal deposit 
insurance legislation, measured either by  the propensity to author legislation 
or to vote for it, was related to the benefits that a state could expect to receive 
from the legislation. Unit banking, small average bank size, and high rates of 
bank failure all were associated with support for legislation. Initially, support 
was not regionally concentrated, and not correlated with banking performance 
at the state level. But by the 1920s, many states that previously had been sup- 
portive of deposit insurance legislation changed course. They liberalized their 
branching laws, developed more concentrated and stable banking systems, and 
became opponents rather than supporters of national  deposit insurance.  The 
“stability gap” across states widened in the  1920s due to regionally  concen- 
trated  depression  in  the  agricultural  sector,  and  to  differences in  branch- 
banking laws at the state level. These developments reduced the relative impor- 
tance of within-state  variation  in the costs and benefits of deposit insurance 
and increased  the across-state  variation in the degree of  support for deposit 
insurance. By the twentieth century, we find evidence consistent with the view 
that states that stood to benefit from the cross-subsidization of risk in a national 
deposit  insurance plan  supported  legislation,  while  those that  enjoyed rela- 
tively  stable banking systems opposed it. The widening  “stability  gap”  be- 
tween unit and branch-banking systems during the 1920s made it unlikely that 
deposit insurance legislation would be passed in Congress. 
6. As a first attempt to test the importance of the Fed membership provision in limiting support 
for the legislation in the House, we compared the Fed membership ratios in 1919 of the “support- 
ing” states with those of twenty-five other “similar” states with stronger voting opposition to insur- 
ance in  1913. Given the importance of  bank size for the Fed membership decision, we controlled 
for this influence by  excluding from the group of “similar” states the relatively large-bank, high- 
population density states of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and all new England. We also com- 
pared the group of  twenty-five states with the eight supporting states that did not have state-level 
deposit insurance plans. If the Fed membership requirement was important for explaining opposi- 
tion to the bill in the House on the part of some rural states, one should expect to find that Fed 
membership ratios were higher  for  the eight “supporting”  states than for the rural  states that 
strongly opposed federal legislation. The comparison may not be as relevant for the five supporting 
states with state-level insurance because small rural state banks in those states might not have been 
harmed as much by  the membership limitation. Comparisons of means and medians between the 
eight noninsured, “supporting” states and the twenty-five-state control group provided weak evi- 
dence in favor of the view that states with more banks that expected to remain outside the Fed 
system would have had been more likely to oppose deposit insurance. 164  Charles W. Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
In  light  of  this  evidence,  which  is  consistent  with  the  standard  Stigler- 
Posner-Peltzman view of the role of special interest groups in pushing through 
legislation, the  1930s are a surprising aberration. According  to the standard 
political-economy paradigm, declining rents of special interests should result 
in elimination of special interest regulations  (or in this case, reductions in the 
probability  of  passage). By  this logic, the continuing failure of  unit banks in 
the early 1930s should have extended the trend toward bank consolidation. The 
continuing erosion of the relative economic and political capital of unit bank- 
ers should have meant a further decline in the likelihood of federal deposit in- 
surance. 
Neither of  these predictions was fulfilled. By late  193  1, representatives of 
eastern states that had not supported deposit insurance for decades introduced 
federal deposit insurance bills. Many of these authors represented urban, not 
rural, constituencies. Federal banking legislation providing for deposit insur- 
ance passed by nearly unanimous consent in 1933. This and other federal legis- 
lation slowed or reversed the trends toward greater bank consolidation, expan- 
sion of branching, and expanded bank powers, all of which had been hailed as 
great progress  in light of  the bank  failures of  the  1920s. What explains this 
reversal in direction and the puzzling increase in the breadth  of support for 
federal deposit insurance in the  1930s? The detailed narrative of the next sec- 
tion shows how events and political  strategy by the proponents of federal de- 
posit insurance turned the tide in favor of its passage. 
5.3  The Debate over Federal Deposit Insurance during the Depression 
5.3.1  Bank Distress, 1930-1932 
Following the 1929 stock market crash, interest in bank reform, which had 
moved slowly in the twenties, stirred. In his December  1929 annual message 
to Congress, President Herbert Hoover called for Congress to establish a joint 
commission to consider banking reform.  The House and the Senate ignored 
the president’s request for a cooperative effort and passed resolutions to initiate 
their own investigations.  However,  1930 was an election year and little was 
accomplished after Congress adjourned on 3 July (Burns 1974,7-9).  The elec- 
tions of  1930 split control of  Congress, giving the Democrats control of  the 
House. For deposit insurance’s future, there was also a crucial change in the 
chairmanship of the House Banking and Currency Committee. The new Dem- 
ocratic chairman would have been Otis Wingo (D-AR), but his sudden death 
in 1930 allowed Henry B. Steagall (D-AL) to take control and alter the course 
of banking reform. A devoted follower of William Jennings Bryan, one of the 
first post-Civil  War proponents of deposit insurance, Steagall had already in- 
troduced  bills  for  deposit  insurance  in  1925,  1926,  and  1928.  Although 
Wingo’s position  on deposit  insurance  is unclear,  he never authored  a bill. 
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banking, but they approached the problem differently. In the struggle over the 
McFadden Act in  1926-27,  Wingo was willing to compromise to place new 
limits on branching, whereas Steagall demanded that branching be eliminated 
entirely.’ For Steagall, deposit insurance was essential to the survival of  unit 
banks; the House committee now had a chairman whose position on deposit 
insurance was unyielding and who would use the power of his office to se- 
cure it. 
The many bank failures of late 1930 pushed the issue of banking reform to 
the fore and led President Hoover to ask Congress in January 193  1 to establish 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to support smaller banks and 
financial institutions. Congress did not immediately respond to this call, and 
Hoover organized a series of meetings with bankers and businessmen in Octo- 
ber 1931, which resulted in the establishment of the National Credit Corpora- 
tion. Through this private corporation, banks pooled funds to lend to  weak 
banks on assets not eligible for discount at the Federal  Reserve banks. Al- 
though  $500 million in funds was made available, the corporation  had only 
lent out $155 million to 575 banks by the end of the year (Bums 1974, 14-15; 
Upham and Lamke 1934,7;  Jones 1951, 14). 
The rise in bank failures beginning in late 1930 spurred congressional action 
on two fronts to increase bank  liquidity. First, Congress passed  the Glass- 
Steagall Act of 193  1, which liberalized the Federal Reserve’s discounting rules 
as of 21 February 1932. Second, Congress passed the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation Act on 22 January 1932. The RFC was authorized to make collat- 
eralized loans to financial institutions for up to three years. The RFC moved 
faster than its private predecessor. By the end of  the first quarter of  1932, it 
had disbursed $124 million, and by 31 December it had provided 7,880 loans 
totaling $810 million. In addition to improving the liquidity of open banks, the 
RFC was empowered to make loans to closed banks to speed the process of 
liquidation and repayment of  depositors. During 1932, the RFC disbursed $42 
million in loans to closed banks (Upham and Lamke 1934, 145-87). Thus the 
RFC improved the confidence of depositors  in  open banks and the pace of 
payment to depositors in  suspended banks. These actions indirectly reduced 
the demand for deposit insurance. 
While these two acts gf Congress may have alleviated some pressures on the 
banks, and some analysts concluded that the RFC helped to arrest the number 
of suspensions (Upham and Lamke 1934, 150-51), bank failures continued at 
an alarmingly high level. But the RFC could not combat the effects of  the 
Federal Reserve’s persistently deflationary policy. The decline in bank failures 
was assisted by the Federal Reserve’s open market purchase of $1 billion from 
April to July 1932, a policy that Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 347-48)  have 
emphasized was not continued after Congress adjourned. 
Pressure on banks continued unabated, as all banks could not qualify for 
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RFC assistance. As in previous financial crises, locally declared moratoria and 
holidays were used to offer banks protection from anxious depositors. Oregon 
acted first in 1930, passing a law that allowed banks to suspend payments for 
sixty days, during which they were to arrange for longer voluntary restrictions 
with depositors. In 193  1, Florida banks were granted the power to restrict with- 
drawals to 20 percent of deposits. By mid- 1932, Massachusetts, Michigan, and 
Virginia adopted similar laws. As the crisis deepened in 1932, mayors in small 
towns and cities in the Midwest declared holidays when restriction  on with- 
drawals were set in place. The Indiana Commission for Financial Institutions 
surveyed the number of banks restricting  payment  as of  May  1932. Replies 
were obtained from thirty-five states that indicated that 658 banks in theirjuris- 
diction had restricted payments, a number that certainly understates the total 
(Upham and Lamke 1934, 11-13). 
5.3.2  Initial Attempts at Insurance and the Deepening Banking Crisis 
The number of  bills  submitted to both the  House and Senate for deposit 
insurance began to rise in late 193  1. In the 7 1st Congress (April  1929-March 
1931), six bills were submitted to the House of Representatives, where they 
died in committee. Between the opening of the first session of the 72d Con- 
gress in December 1931 and its closure in July 1932, five bills were submitted 
to the Senate and fifteen to the House of Representatives. The only bill to leave 
committee was Steagall’s second bill introduced on 14 April 1932. The House 
passed the bill quickly on 27 May  1932, when, after a voice vote, it was given 
unanimous assent. Despite this success, the bill died in the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee, where Senator Glass, an adamant opponent of deposit 
insurance, held sway. Pushing his own panacea, the separation of commercial 
and investment banking, Glass sponsored banking reform bills that made no 
progress in Congress, especially the House, where there was strong sentiment 
for some form of deposit insurance. By the end of the year, Glass would not 
accede to deposit insurance, but he did include a provision for a Liquidation 
Corporation to speed up the liquidation of failed banks (Bums 1974, 25). 
An impasse had  been  reached  in Congress  where  Congressman  Steagall 
would not agree to any bill that failed to include deposit insurance, and Senator 
Glass would not consent to any bill that included it. There was little in the 
elections of  1932 to encourage the supporters of  deposit insurance.  Sensing 
victory in the elections, the Democratic Party adopted several planks on bank 
reform, but these all bore the imprimatur of  Senator Glass. The party called 
for quicker methods of realizing  on assets for the relief  of  deposits  in sus- 
pended banks, more rigid supervision to protect deposits, and the separation 
of commercial and investment banking. Roosevelt supported these planks and 
took Glass’s side. The presidential candidate was himself strongly opposed to 
the idea of guaranteeing deposits (Bums 1974,22-24).  Clearly, the Democratic 
landslide did not make the adoption of deposit insurance certain. 
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portant source of trouble, the continued deflationary monetary policy, was not 
reversed.  In addition, the effectiveness of  the RFC may have been  compro- 
mised. In July 1932, Congress required that the names of banks receiving RFC 
loans be published beginning in August. Banks may have feared damage to 
their reputation or a run if they borrowed from the RFC. The problem became 
worse when, in January  1933, after a House resolution, the RFC made public 
all loans extended before  1933. Although the law only required reports to be 
made to the president and the Congress, the Speaker of the House, John Nance 
Garner, instructed the clerk to make the reports public on the grounds that they 
wanted  to prevent favoritism in the loans. Availability  of funds was not re- 
duced, but new loans to open banks in the fourth quarter of  1932 were smaller 
than in any of the previous three quarters (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 325; 
Upham and Lamke 1934, 148). 
As more banks failed, the crisis in the payments systems intensified. Restric- 
tions on withdrawals that had been local or voluntary proved insufficient. The 
first state banking holiday was declared in Nevada on 31 October 1932, when 
runs on individual banks threatened to involve the whole state. This holiday 
was  originally  set  for  a twelve-day  period  but  was  subsequently  extended 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 429). Iowa declared a holiday  on 20 January 
1933, and Louisiana declared a holiday to help the banks in New Orleans on 3 
February. Grave banking problems spread to the industrial Midwest. The De- 
troit banks were on the verge of collapse with over a million depositors, and 
Michigan declared a bank holiday 14 February. In the second week of the holi- 
day, depositors were permitted to draw out only 5 percent of their balances. In 
Cleveland, all but one bank suspended payments on 27 February, restricting 
withdrawals  to under  5 percent  (Jones  1951, 69-70).  Even  when  the  RFC 
stepped in, it  could not  halt suspensions.  By July  1932, sixty-five Chicago 
banks had obtained RFC loans, but by February 1933 only eighteen remained 
open (Upham and Lamke 1934, 156). Declarations of holidays and moratoria 
picked up momentum. By 3 March, holidays  limiting withdrawals  had been 
declared by executive order or legislation in thirty-six states. On 4 March, the 
banking-center states of Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts 
were among six more states that declared holidays (Patrick 1993, 132). 
The holidays increased withdrawal pressures on banks in other states, espe- 
cially on the New York City banks. There was also fear of a run on the dollar, 
as many believed the new administration would devalue the dollar (Wigmore 
1987). The Federal Reserve responded by  raising discount rates in February 
1933, and it failed to offset this contractionary move, scarcely increasing its 
total holdings of government securities (Friedman and Schwartz 1963,326). 
5.3.3  The National Banking Holiday, RFC Policy, and the Rejection of a 
Bailout 
In this  crisis atmosphere, Franklin D. Roosevelt  immediately  ordered the 
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suspended for a period of four days, during which banks could make change, 
cash government checks, and conduct other activities where no cash payment 
was required. The president’s authority for this action was based on the Trading 
with the Enemy Act, but he sought specific authority from Congress as soon 
as it reopened on 9 March 1933. Within an hour of its receipt, Congress passed 
the Emergency Bank Act, which confirmed the proclamation  of 6 March and 
gave the president and the secretary of  the treasury  the authority to regulate 
the business of banks during any such emergency period as the president might 
designate. The president issued a proclamation  on 9 March extending the pre- 
vious proclamation  until further notice. The next day an executive order au- 
thorized the secretary of  the treasury  and the supervisory authorities in each 
state to permit the opening of banks after they obtained a license either from 
the secretary or from the state supervisory authority if they were not Fed mem- 
bers. On 11 March, Roosevelt announced a schedule for reopening the com- 
mercial banks. Licensed member banks in the twelve Federal Reserve Bank 
cities could  open on  13 March. Licensed member banks  in 250 cities with 
clearinghouse  associations could open on  14 March,  and  all other licensed 
member banks could open on 15 March. The schedule for opening nonmember 
state banks was left to the discretion of state banking authorities. 
Although most banks were reopened, a significant fraction of the industry 
remained shut down. At the end of  1932, two months before the banking holi- 
day, there were 17,796 active commercial banks in operation with $28.2 billion 
in deposits (seasonally adjusted). Between 31 December  1932 and  15 March 
1933, 447 banks were suspended,  merged, or liquidated. When  the  holiday 
ended, the  11,878 licensed banks had $27.4 billion  in deposits on 14 March 
1933 while the 5,430 unlicensed banks held $4.5 billion. The unlicensed banks 
included  1,621 Fed member banks and 3,709 nonmember banks with $2.9 and 
$1.6 billion in deposits, respectively. The unlicensed banks were left in limbo 
to be opened later or finally closed (Friedman and Schwartz 1963,421-27,  and 
tables  13 and  14). Their  depositors  had  only  extremely  limited  access  to 
funds-5  percent of their total deposits (Upham  and Lamke 1934, 5). The 
decline in deposits was tied to the closing of banks. Between December  1932 
and 15 March 1933, deposits in banks open for business fell by one-sixth, and 
70 percent of this decline was accounted for by  the deposits on the books of 
banks not licensed to open (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 426-28).x 
The licensing process was not very rapid. Between  15 March and 30 June, 
the number of unlicensed banks fell from 5,430 to 3,078, reducing the deposits 
8. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 328-30)  have thus argued that the banking holiday  was far 
more restrictive than any of the earlier suspensions as far back as I8 14. Banks had not been closed 
down  entirely  for a day, but  now they were closed for a minimum of  six business days. In the 
earlier episodes, banks had continued most activities except the unlimited payment of deposits on 
demand, and sometimes were able to expand loans under these circumstances. In  1933, access to 
all deposits was denied. Friedman and Schwartz conclude that “the ‘cure’ was close to being worse 
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in suspended banks from $4.5 billion to $2.2 billion. Of the 2,352 banks pro- 
cessed,  1,964 banks with deposits of  $642 million  were reopened, and  388 
banks with deposits of $1,189 million were suspended, liquidated, or merged. 
By 30 December 1934, there were still 1,769 unlicensed banks with $1 billion 
in deposits, and it took until December  1936 to dispose of these institutions. 
Overall, of the banks unlicensed on 15 March  1933, 3,298 reopened for busi- 
ness with $1.5 billion in deposits, while  2,132 with  deposits of  $2.5 billion 
were closed or merged. 
The RFC seems to have played a modest role in stabilizing the banking sys- 
tem. The banks that were immediately opened were very strong and required 
little assistance. In fact, RFC outstanding loans to open banks declined contin- 
uously from $677 million at the end of the first quarter of  1933 to $462 million 
by the end of the year, and its purchases of capital obligations remained small 
until  December  1933 (Upham  and Lamke  1934,  149,  188-206).  The RFC 
shifted its activity to providing capital for the reopening of  weak banks and 
making loans to speed up the process of liquidating insolvent banks.’ 
The RFC Act had given authority to the corporation to make loans to closed 
banks for liquidation or reorganization, and empowered receivers to borrow 
from the corporation, setting a ceiling of $200 million on these types of loans. 
Loans were offered on the estimated recovery from pledged assets. Loans out- 
standing for this purpose rose from $48 million at the end of the first quarter 
1933 to $100 million by the end of the second quarter. In June, the ceiling was 
lifted,  and  by  the end  of  the  year  loans  totaled  $292 million  (Upham  and 
Lamke 1934, 162-87).  These loans were intended to speed up the process of 
paying out depositors of closed institutions. 
There were attempts to force the RFC to liberalize its loan procedure. Nu- 
merous bills were introduced to Congress to provide for partial or complete 
payoff of bank  depositors. Representatives from Michigan and Ohio, where 
some of  the largest banks had  been  closed, pushed  for this  legislation. The 
most active sponsor of these proposals was Representative Clarence J. McLeod 
of Michigan. His first bill, introduced on I3 April 1933, mandated the RFC to 
loan 70 percent of  the book value of bank assets. In the next session of  Con- 
gress, McLeod introduced a bill to purchase all assets of closed national banks 
at a price sufficient to pay all depositors in full and liquidate the assets over a 
ten-year  period. The 73d Congress was pressed to pass a new McLeod bill, 
lobbied by the Hearst newspapers and the governors of  several states. While 
President Roosevelt opposed these measures, Speaker Rainey, Majority Leader 
Burns, and Chairman Steagall were reportedly in favor of some form of payoff. 
Finally, in May 1934, 119 members of the House signed a petition to force the 
9. The RFC was financed by the Treasury. By 30 June 1934, the Treasury had subscribed to $50 
million  of  the RFC’s capital  and bought  $3.3 billion  of its notes,  bearing interest  ranging from 
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bill to a vote (53 Democrats, 61 Republicans, and 5 Farmer-Laborites). Testi- 
fying against this proposal in the House Banking Committee, the secretary of 
the treasury estimated that a payoff of deposits of $2,500 or less in banks that 
had  failed  since  1 January  1930 would  cost  the  Treasury  over  $1 billion 
(Upham and Lamke 1934, 181-87). The bill failed to win passage. Thus, while 
Congress would become willing in mid-1933 to vote for deposit insurance, it 
was never willing to countenance a bailout. 
5.3.4  How Federal Deposit Insurance Was Won 
While  Congress rejected  a  bailout  of  depositors,  a  battle  ensued  over 
whether deposit insurance would be included in a reform bill. Flood’s (199  1) 
survey of the contemporary  deposit  insurance debate reveals  that  it was ex- 
tremely well-informed and considered all the issues that are today believed to 
be pertinent to deposit insurance. This is not surprising in light of the collapses 
of state deposit insurance systems in the 1920s, which had been observed and 
commented  upon  frequently.  Indeed,  the  American  Bankers  Association 
(1933) provided  a detailed quantitative analysis of the state insurance system 
failures as part of its campaign against federal deposit insurance. Opponents 
of  deposit  insurance  used this evidence  as an example of  the moral-hazard 
costs of  providing government guarantees to depositors. 
Proponents of deposit insurance did not try to dismiss the potential impor- 
tance of  such costs. Rather, they  argued  that  deposit  insurance  could avoid 
moral-hazard costs if properly designed. Furthermore, they argued that deposit 
insurance was necessary  and fair. Supporters of  deposit insurance  argued it 
was a matter of simple justice that depositors not be forced to bear the losses 
from bankers’ mistakes or folly. On the other side, bankers argued that it was 
unjust for well-managed banks to subsidize poorly run banks. The president of 
the American Bankers Association pointed out that deposit insurance would 
mean a net transfer from big banks, where most deposits were, to smaller state- 
chartered banks, where most of the losses were. The money center banks all 
emphasized that it was not an actuarially sound insurance plan, as premiums 
were not set by exposure to risk. 
The character of  the bank failures of  the  1930s and the widespread losses 
suffered by depositors throughout the country were a new and important ingre- 
dient in the political debate after 1932. Figure 5.1 reports data on the number 
of failing national banks, and figure 5.2 shows the percentage of proven claims 
paid one, two, and three years after national banks were placed in receivership. 
From  I929 to 1933, as the number of banks failing increased, the percentage 
of deposit claims recovered fell dramatically. In prior decades, bank failures 
had sometimes  been numerous, but never had there been so many bank failures 
at such high cost, and never had this cost been spread throughout the country. 
In the  recession  of  1920-21,  there were  large losses  for the  relatively  few 
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fairly high, and losses were concentrated  in a few states. But in the  1930s, 
failures rose and recoveries fell; few people in the country did not know some- 
one who had lost substantial wealth as the result of the banking collapse. Thus 
the expected value of a dollar deposit fell precipitously. 
The severity of these costs, however, by  itself was not enough to produce 
success for the proponents of deposit insurance. Even after the banking crisis 
of  1933, there still was formidable opposition to deposit insurance. President 
Roosevelt, Secretary of the Treasury Woodin, Senator Carter Glass, the Ameri- 
can Bankers Association, and the Association of Reserve City Bankers all re- 
mained opposed to deposit insurance. While not offering any formal position, 
the leading officials of the Federal  Reserve did not  favor insurance.  On the 
other side, Vice President John Nance Garner, Jesse Jones of  the RFC, and 
Chairman Steagall favored deposit insurance. 
Perhaps  most  important,  the  severity  of  losses  during  the  early  1930s 
changed the location of the debate over deposit insurance. For decades, deposit 
insurance.had been  one of  the hundreds of  issues coming before  Congress 
repeatedly. Like most others, it received relatively little attention from the gen- 
eral public, and its fate was determined by the relative weights of special inter- 
ests measured on hidden scales in smoke-filled rooms. The banking crisis had 
the attention of the public, and the costs of the crisis were one of the major 
public concerns of the time. The debate over banking reform thus moved from 
the smoke-filled room to the theater of public debate. Once it became a focal 
issue of relevance for the election of 1934, the contest between proponents and 
opponents became a struggle for the hearts and minds of the public.  Public 
support  would  be courted,  and public  support-not  just special interests- 
would govern congressional voting. 
Public attitudes were shaped in part by events and debates of the 1930s other 
than those that pertained directly to deposit insurance. People’s perceptions of 
banks had been changed by  the events of the Great Depression,  and the way 
those events were interpreted at the time. In particular, many influential con- 
temporaries were arguing that banks were the perpetrators rather than the vic- 
tims of the Great Depression. Bankers were sometimes referred to as gambling 
“banksters”  in the popular  press.  Some critics  of  banks argued simply that 
bankers were to blame because depositors placed funds with bankers for safe- 
keeping,  and such funds should not have been  risked at the depositors’  ex- 
pense. By 1933, it had become commonplace to blame the stock market crash 
and  the  Depression  on the recklessness  and greed  of  large,  reserve-center 
banks. The press and the Pecora hearings blamed the speculative excesses of 
the 1920s on the big-city bankers, depicting the depositor-and  to some extent 
the bank shareholder-as  a victim of bankers’ greed.I0 The Pecora hearings, 
10. Stockholderr of  national  banks were liable for extended (double) liability  on their capital 
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which were widely covered in the press, involved little evidence or systematic 
discussion, and their conclusions have been questioned by subsequent scholar- 
ship (White  1986; Benston  1989; Kroszner and Rajan  1993). The hearings 
provided scapegoats for the financial collapse of  1929-33  and a springboard 
for new regulation. 
The challenge  for Steagall and his allies was to break the deadlock  with 
Glass by  wooing the public,  and by  offering Glass something  he wanted- 
namely, the separation of commercial and investment banking. Steagall’s strat- 
egy for winning the public debate was to respond to the actuarial and fairness 
concerns of critics of deposit insurance, while stressing the evils of large-scale 
banking and the unfairness of making depositors pay for bankers’ errors. Stea- 
gall responded to critics by emphasizing that his system would only cover the 
small depositor because of the ceilings on deposits insured. The actual ceiling 
set in  1933 for insured  deposits of $2,500 covered 97 percent of depositors 
and 24 percent of deposits (Board of Governors  1933,414). Moreover, his bill 
provided for less than 100 percent coverage even of  small deposits, which he 
argued would reduce problems of moral hazard. Finally, in comparison to the 
state systems, a federal system with its broader geographic coverage (including 
industrial areas) would diversify and strengthen the plan. 
Steagall also wanted to allow membership in the insured system for state 
banks  who  were  not  members  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  As  Keeton 
(1990, 31) points out, this  may  have been  a crucial ingredient for receiving 
support from small rural banks who were not members of the Fed. Many of 
these banks earlier had joined forces with big-city banks to oppose deposit 
insurance legislation. Apparently, for many small, rural banks, the value of the 
cross-bank subsidy from flat-rate federal deposit insurance was not as great as 
the costs of complying with Fed regulations, and so their support for insurance 
hinged on allowing state nonmember banks to join. 
On  1 I  March, Glass introduced a bill that was very similar to his previous 
bank reform bill-once  again, without deposit insurance. The president called 
a White House conference attended by  Treasury officials,  representatives of 
the Federal  Reserve  Board,  and  Senator Glass. Working on the basis of the 
for new national  bank  share issues in  1933, and for all outstanding issues  in  1935 (Macey and 
Miller 1992, 38). The earlier repeal of double liability for new shares reflected the perceived need 
to spur new invcstment to replenish bank capital stock. But the repeal of double liability for bank 
stockholders reflected other currents of thought that a150 favored federal deposit insurance. Prior 
to the  19309, extended liability  of shareholders was deemed an  adequate means of  protecting 
depositors, and there was little concern for shareholders, possibly  because bank shares (like other 
stock) were much  more closely held  prior  to the  mid-1920s. In  the  1930s, bank stockholders’ 
losses were large (with recoveries  totaling roughly  half their capital contributions to the bank), 
and these losses did not prevent the collapse of the banking system or large losses to depositors 
(Macey and Miller 1992. 34). Stockholders, who by  now  tended to be largely  firm “outsiders,” 
were  viewed  as innocent  victims of  bank management. Thus the double-liability provision was 
deemed both  unfair and ineffectual in limiting bank runs by  the mid-1930s (Macey  and Miller 
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Glass bill, there were further conferences and consultations for the next six 
weeks, with Glass a frequent visitor. Senator Duncan Fletcher, chairman of the 
Banking and Currency Committee, and Steagall were also polled (Burns 1974, 
80). The most hotly contested issue was deposit insurance, which neither the 
president nor Glass wanted included in the bill. But congressional pressure was 
building. Twenty-five Democratic house members signed a petition in support 
of a guarantee in early March (Burns  1974, 89-90).  Key congressmen,  like 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg  (R-MI), became outspoken  insurance advocates 
after local bank  failures  generated enormous  constituent  pressure.”  Patrick 
(1993, 176) argues that mounting public pressure in support of deposit insur- 
ance at this juncture partly reflected anti-big-bank sentiment due to the coinci- 
dent resumption of the Pecora hearings, with testimony from J. P.  Morgan and 
George Whitney that made front-page news. Glass reportedly told the White 
House that,  if  insurance was not  put  into the  administration  bill,  Congress 
would include it anyway. Glass reportedly yielded to public opinion because 
‘‘Washington  does not remember any issue on which the sentiment of the coun- 
try has been so undivided or so emphatically expressed as upon this.”’2 
In mid-May, Glass and Steagall each introduced their own bills with changes 
in the structure of the Federal Reserve, separation of  commercial and invest- 
ment banking, equal branching rights for national banks (which had more lim- 
ited rights than state banks), and a plan for the creation of  the FDIC (Bums 
1974, 8 1). Both bills included specifications made by the Roosevelt adminis- 
tration  that deposit coverage be based on a sliding scale and that there be a 
one-year delay in the start of the insurance corporation. Accounts were to be 
100 percent  insured up to $10,000, 75 percent for deposits between $10,000 
and $50,000, and 50 percent for funds in excess of $50,000. Deposit insurance 
was to be financed by assessments levied on banks, the Federal Reserve Banks, 
and  $150 million  from the Treasury. It would begin  on  1 July  1934 (Burns 
1974,90). 
Glass’s original bill required  all FDIC member banks to join the Federal 
Reserve, but he was blocked by a coalition led by  Steagall in the House and 
Huey  Long  in  the  Senate, joined by  Senator  Vandenberg,  who  feared  this 
would end state-chartered banking. Long, who had blocked Glass’s bill in the 
previous  Congress  with  a  ten-day  filibuster,  virulently  opposed  Glass’s 
branching provisions. Long and Steagall extolled deposit insurance as a means 
of survival for the small banks and the dual banking system (Flood 1991, 5  1- 
52). Eager for a bill to separate commercial and  investment  banking, Glass 
11. The large bank  failures of  Detroit had  converted Vandenberg into a supporter of  deposit 
insurance. His switch reveals a response to the more general interests of his constituents rather 
than the special interests of hankers. He had come on board Steagall’s ship, but he did not change 
his basic beliefs. In his testimony on the Federal Deposit Insurance Act  of  1950, he opposed 
raising the insurance limit from $5,000 to $10,000  because “there is no general public demand for 
this increased coverage. It is chiefly requested by  banker demand in some quarters for increased 
competitive advantage in bidding for deposits” (Senate 1950, 50-5  I). 
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finally agreed to support deposit guarantee and the coverage of nonmember 
banks in exchange for more Federal Reserve authority. The prohibition of inter- 
est payments on deposits appears to have been another part of this elaborately 
crafted compromise. Glass argued that the prohibition  of interest was neces- 
sary to reduce the flow of interbank deposits to reserve centers, where funds 
were often invested in securities. Consistent with his desire to break the link 
between commercial and investment banking, Glass viewed the investment of 
interbank  deposits  in  the securities  market  as  a  destabilizing  influence  on 
banks.I3 
This carefully  crafted  compromise bill  reflected  the  tenuous  balance of 
power between the dominant factions in the House and Senate. However, in a 
maneuver reflecting the ability of individuals to use congressional rules to alter 
the balance of power, the bill was radically amended by a proposal of Senator 
Vandenberg. His amendment proposed to create a temporary deposit insurance 
fund, thereby offering deposit insurance more quickly. The amendment of the 
bill was engineered by Vice President Garner, who was presiding over the Sen- 
ate, while it sat as a court of impeachment in the trial of  a district judge. In a 
surprise move that enabled him to seize control of the agenda, Gamer tempo- 
rarily  suspended the court proceedings  and ordered the Senate into regular 
session  to consider  the  amendment  presented  by  Vandenberg.  The amend- 
ment-establishing  a temporary fund effective 1 January 1934 to provide 100 
percent coverage up to $2,500 for each depositor until a permanent corporation 
began operation on 1 July  1934-was  overwhelmingly adopted (Federal De- 
posit Insurance Corporation  1984, 41-43).  The bill was almost derailed in a 
joint conference committee on  12 June, but survived to pass both houses of 
Congress the next day. Glass was forced to make another concession and per- 
mit nonmember banks to join under the amendment’s terms. The American 
Bankers Association urged its members to telegraph the president to veto the 
bill. Although the president was opposed to the Vandenberg amendment, Glass 
warned him not to delay, and Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933 on 16 
June 1933. 
Under the provisions of the Banking Act, the Temporary Deposit Insurance 
Fund would begin operations on 1 January 1934. Only those banks certified as 
sound could qualify for insurance (Burns 1974, 120). The capital required to 
establish the FDIC was contributed  by the Treasury and the twelve  Federal 
Reserve banks. Banks joining the FDIC were assessed 0.5 percent of insurable 
deposits,  of  which one-half  was payable immediately  and the remainder on 
call. All Federal Reserve member banks were required to join the FDIC; other 
13. Golembe (1975, 64) rejects Glass’s stated motivation for restriction of  interest rates on de- 
posits and argues that interest rate restrictions were simply a payoff to big banks to reduce their 
opposition to the Banking Act of 1933. Golembe provides no evidence in support ofthis interpreta- 
tion. Moreover, big banks continued to devote energy to overturning deposit insurance during and 
after the inclusion of a provision for an interest rate ceiling, so it is hard to see any effect of interest 
rate restrictions on big hankers’ willingness to accept deposit insurance. 176  Charles W. Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
licensed banks could receive FDIC protection  upon approval of the FDIC so 
long as they became Fed members within two years. 
Throughout  1933, many banks still were adamant in their opposition to in- 
surance. The American Bankers Association at its annual meeting adopted a 
resolution to recommend that the administration postpone initiation of deposit 
insurance (Burns 1974, 125). They hoped that Congress would reconvene and 
make some adjustment, but they were sorely disappointed. When the Tempo- 
rary Deposit Insurance Fund was given a one-year extension in 1934 and per- 
manent deposit insurance was postponed, Steagall pushed his agenda further. 
Steagall wanted to increase the deposit coverage from $2,500 to $10,000. Al- 
though Roosevelt opposed this change and pointed out that 97 percent of  de- 
positors already were protected, Congress followed Steagall’s lead and set the 
account limit at $5,000 (Burns  1974, 127-28).  In addition, compulsory mem- 
bership in the Fed was postponed from 1 July  1936 until  I  July 1937. Bankers 
gradually gave up their opposition and accepted that deposit insurance would 
remain in place (Bums 1974, 129). 
The temporary  system was extended to  1 July 1935 by  an amendment in 
1934, and to 3 1 August 1935 by a congressional resolution signed by the presi- 
dent. On 23 August, 1935, the permanent system finally became effective un- 
der Title I  of the Banking Act of 1935, which created the FDIC and superseded 
the original permanent plan, liberalizing many of its provisions. All members 
of  the Federal Reserve System were required to insure their deposits with the 
FDIC. Nonmember banks with less than  $1 million in deposits could obtain 
insurance upon approval of the FDIC, but were required to submit to examina- 
tion by  the FDIC. The insurance limit was set at $5,000 for each depositor. 
Insured banks were charged a premium of one-twelfth  of  1 percent of  their 
deposits payable semiannually. This was a substantial reduction from 0.5 per- 
cent, half of  which was paid  to the temporary  fund, which was returned to 
banks upon its closure. 
5.3.5  Winners, Losers, and Political Entrepreneurs 
By 1935, it had become clear who had won and who had lost from the pro- 
visions of the permanent deposit insurance plan. Small, rural banks, and lower- 
income individuals  (with small deposit accounts) were clear winners,  while 
large, big-city banks, wealthy depositors, and depositors in failed banks were 
the losers. Depositors of relatively  stable urban banks effectively subsidized 
the deposits in less stable rural banks. Under the 1935 law, wealthy depositors 
contributed premiums as a fraction of all their deposits (through their banks), 
but only received protection on deposits up to $5,000, providing an effective 
subsidy from the rich to the poor. Depositors in failed banks were not bailed 
out despite the strenuous efforts by some congressmen on their behalf. Further- 
more, the presence of deposit insurance removed one of  the main motivations 
for allowing further consolidation and branching in banking, which would have 
mainly benefited  larger banks.  Small, rural banks now had access to federal 177  The Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance 
government insurance at low cost. In particular, access to federal insurance did 
not require small banks to pay the high regulatory cost of joining the Fed, and 
insurance protected virtually all of their deposits. 
Some who benefited most from federal deposit insurance-small  depositors 
and small, rural banks-were  not very visible advocates of insurance from the 
beginning of the insurance debate. As Keeton (1990) points out, not all small, 
rural banks supported deposit insurance, as some insurance plans would have 
created  more costs than benefits  for small banks.  In  particular,  small banks 
were concerned that Fed membership might be a requirement for deposit insur- 
ance, or that the fee structure of deposit insurance might be designed in a way 
that would put them at a disadvantage.  Similarly, the gains  small depositors 
received did not reflect any initial active lobbying effort on their part, although 
their voice was clearly heard after the banking crises. Small depositors were 
not  a well-organized,  coordinated  special interest  pushing  for legislation  to 
create a transfer of resources from the rich to the poor. The public’s role was 
important, but it was not the initiator of the legislation. The public reacted to 
overtures by congressional  advocates of deposit insurance who sought to use 
public support as a lever against their opponents in Congress. 
Without the “political entrepreneurship”  of Steagall and others, the benefi- 
ciaries of deposit insurance would not have played an important role in influ- 
encing legislation. Steagall, Long, and other politicians with populist constitu- 
encies  made deposit insurance  a focal  issue, and thus made public  opinion 
an important ingredient in the outcome.  They also shepherded bills through 
Congress, making sure the details of the bills (premiums, membership limita- 
tiops, deposit coverage) would protect the interests of small, unit banks, and 
they knew that these banks would be grateful for the help, even if they had not 
pushed  for it. In  the  standard  Stigler-Posner-Peltzman  view of  the political 
economy of regulation, rent-seeking special interest groups typically are iden- 
tified as the political entrepreneurs who define which issues are important and 
push for their passage. In the case of federal deposit insurance, entrepreneurial 
politicians defined an issue they thought would be beneficial  to their constit- 
uents, structured the forum in which it would be debated to serve their pur- 
poses, 0nd organized constituent support for their proposals. 
5.4  Lessons for Models of Political Economy 
What general lessons for the political economy of regulation can be culled 
from the fifty-year struggle over federal deposit insurance? We would empha- 
size three general caveats to the standard Stigler-Posner-Peltzman view that 
rent-seeking special interests define and determine regulatory outcomes. 
First, there is more than one theater of action in the political process. If the 
proponents of regulation can succeed in drawing sufficient public attention to 
their issue, then politicians will respond to public pressure, not just to special 
interests. Second, influential politicians, not just special interests, may be insti- 178  Charles W.  Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
gators of regulation and may play an especially important role in determining 
which issues become “focal” to the general public, and in winning public sup- 
port. Third, while public opinion may have been somewhat informed, it is not 
likely that the public anticipated all the changes wrought by  its support for 
federal deposit insurance. Furthermore, once public support had been won dur- 
ing the debate of  1932-34, the theater of debate predictably shifted back to the 
smoke-filled room as the attention of the public moved on to other issues. After 
the hurdle of  establishing deposit insurance had been cleared and the public 
was no longer easily mobilized, the special interests within banking struggled 
among themselves over changes in the law. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
of  1950  was a compromise that offered something to all banks and looks more 
like a creature of the Stigler-Posner-Peltzman paradigm. The act increased the 
insurance limit, as desired by small banks, and introduced a scheme for a par- 
tial rebating of  assessments that pleased large banks. Once unit bankers had 
been given a new lease on life by  deposit insurance, they were able to exert 
influence Over other regulation, as well. Progress in permitting expanded scope 
and scale of banking was stalled.I4 
It is interesting to contrast the deposit insurance debate of  the  1930s with 
that of the 1990s. Deposit insurance reform to protect the interest of the taxpay- 
ers has fallen far short of the ambitious plans outlined by many would-be re- 
formers. In part, this seems due to the fact that the issue simply has not cap- 
tured the imagination of the population, even in the face of a $200 billion loss 
in the savings and loan industry, and the possibility of large losses to the FDIC. 
It was hardly mentioned in the election of  1992. Why has no political entrepre- 
neur in the House or Senate come forward as Steagall did, with a bold plan to 
make reform a focal issue in the public eye? One possible explanation is that 
hard-headed economic arguments about incentives do not play as well in the 
public theater as soft-hearted populist arguments about fairness. Another ex- 
planation is that politicians do not see big benefits  for their most influential 
constituencies from supporting a major reform. No political entrepreneur has 
yet appeared who can assemble a powerful enough coalition to upset the ex- 
isting balance of special interests. 
14. For a discussion of the political and regulatory reversal of  interest in expansion of branching 
after 1933, see Doti and Schweikart 1991. Table 5A.1  Characteristics  of Authors of Federal Deposit Insurance Bills and Amendments 
~~~  ~ 
Party- 
Item  Intro Date  Cong.  Title  Author  State  City District"  Typeb  Banks Covered in Bill's Provisions 
1  1886/1/11 
2  1886/2/1 
3  1886/2/15 
4  1886/3/1 
5  1888/1/4 
6  1891/12/10 
7  1892/3/23 
8  1893/8/14 
9  1893/9/9 
10  1893/9/22 
11  1894/3/26 
12  1895/1/3 
13  1897/1/5 
14  1897/3/15 
15  1897/7/15 
16  1897/7/15 
17  1898/1/5 
18  1898/2/1 
19  1905/2/27 
20  1905/12/4 
21  1906/1/19 
22  1906/2/14 
23  1906/3/5 
24  1906/12/13 
25  1906/12/17 
26  1907/12/2 
(continued) 
49th  Rep. 
49th  Rep. 
49th  Rep. 
49th  Rep. 
50th  Rep. 
52d  Sen. 
52d  Rep. 
53d  Sen. 
53d  Rep. 
53d  Rep. 
53d  Rep. 
53d  Sen. 
54th  Sen. 
55th  Rep. 
55th  Rep. 
55th  Rep. 
55th  Rep. 
55th  Rep. 
58th  Rep. 
59th  Rep. 
59th  Rep. 
59th  Rep. 
59th  Rep. 
59th  Rep. 
59th  Rep. 








































































































National Table 5A.1  (continued) 
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19071  1212 
I 9071  1  212 
1907/  1 212 
19071  1 212 
1 9071  I 2/2 
190711  211 6 
190711  2/16 
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Rep.  Noms 
Rep.  Sheppard 
Rep.  Russell 
Rep.  Gronna 
Rep.  Underwood 
Rep.  Bates 
Rep.  Campbell 
Rep.  Reeder 
Rep.  Chaney 
Rep.  Underwood 
Sen.  Owen 
Rep.  Hinshaw 
Rep.  DeArmond 
Sen.  Culberson 
Sen.  Brown 
Rep.  Fulton 
Rep.  FowleP 
Rep.  Davidson 
Rep.  McHenryc 
Sen.  Nelson 
Rep.  Adair 
Sen.  Owen 
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Sen.  Gore 
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National and state 
National and state 
National 54  1908/2/17 
55  1908/3/15 
56  1908/3/13 
57  1908/3/16 
58  1908/3/25 
59  1909/3/18 
60  1909/3/24 
61  1909/5/3 
62  1909/12/10 
63  1909/12/10 
64  1910/2/28 
65  1910/6/16 
66  1911/7/26 
67  1911/12/12 
68  1913/11/10 
69  l913/11/25 
70  1913/12/1 
71  1913/12/18 
72  1913/12/23 
73  1914/1/16 
74  1914/3/10 
75  1914/9/12 
76  1915/12/6 
77  1915/12/7 
78  1915/12/10 
79  1917/4/4 
80  1917/4/6 
81  1918/2/18 
82  1918/2/18 
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National 
Federal Reserve members 
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National 
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Party- 

















1919/5/26  66th  Sen.  Williams 
1919/5/26  66th  Sen.  Owen' 
1920/12/13  66th  Rep.  McClintic 
1921/4/1  I  67th  Rep.  McClintic 
1922/9/16  67th  Rep.  Smith 
1923/2/3  67th  Sen.  Brookhart 
1923/12/5  68th  Rep.  McClintic 
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Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
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Federal Reserve members 
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Atlanta  B 
B 




Columbus  B 
New York  B 
National 
Federal Reserve members 
(except banks in states with 
insurance) 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
(except banks in states with 
insurance) 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
(except banks in states with 
insurance) 
Cooperative National 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 




Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Cooperative national 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members; 
state members have option to 
withdraw 
(continued) Table 5A.1  (continued) 
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1932/1/26  72d  Sen.  Lewis  D-IL  Chicago 
1932/2/8  72d  Rep.  Shallenbcrger  D-NE 
1932/2/20  72d  Rep.  Jenkins  R-OH 
1932/2/26  72d  Sen.  Fletcher'  D-FL 
1932/3/2  72d  Rep.  Disneyc  D-OK  Tulsa 
1932/3/5  72d  Rep.  Cable  R-OH 
1932/3/7  72d  Sen.  Fess  R-OH 
1932/3/7  72d  Rep.  Steagall'  D-AL 
19321317  72d  Rep.  McClintic  D-OK 
193213121  72d  Rep.  Taylor  R-TN 
1932/4/13  72d  Rep.  Strong'  R-KS 
1932/4/14  72d  Rep.  Steagalld  D-AL 
1932/5/21  72d  Sen.  FletcheP  D-FL 
1932/12/23  72d  Sen.  Vandenberg  R-MI 
136  1933/3/9  73d  Rep.  Jenkins  R-OH 

















Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Banks and DIs; non-Federal 
Reserve have withdrawal 
option 
Banks and DIs; non-Federal 
Reserve have withdrawal 
option 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
National 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 138  1933/3/10 
139  1933/3/10 
140  1933/3/11 
141  1933/3/14 
142  1933/3/14 
143  1933/3/15 
144  1933/3/16 
145  1933/3/17 
146  1933/4/20 
147  1933/5/9 
148  1933/5/10 
149  1933/5/15 














Sen.  Vandenberg 
Sen.  McAdoo 
Sen.  Fletcher 
Rep.  Hastings 
Rep.  Johnson 
Rep.  Whitely 
Rep.  Church' 
Rep.  Shallenberger 
Rep.  Carter 
Rep.  McLeod 
Rep.  SteagalP 
Sen.  Glass' 



























Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Federal Reserve members 
Federal Reserve members and 
sound nonmembers 
Source: Data are available through the Interuniversity  Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
"City district refers to the large-city congressional districts of representatives introducing bills. 
bB = bill in which banks provide mutual insurance; G = bill in which the government provides a guarantee 
'Member  of  the House or Senate committee to which the bill was referred. 
dChair of  the House or Senate committee to which the bill was referred. 186  Charles W. Calomiris and Eugene N. White 
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